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Recent research [1] has suggested that coreness, and not degree, constitutes a better topological descriptor to
identifying influential spreaders in complex networks. This hypothesis has been verified in the context of disease
spreading. Here, we instead focus on rumor spreading models, which are more suited for social contagion and
information propagation. To this end, we perform extensive computer simulations on top of several real-world
networks and find opposite results. Namely, we show that the spreading capabilities of the nodes do not depend
on their k-core index, which instead determines whether or not a given node prevents the diffusion of a rumor
to a system-wide scale. Our findings are relevant both for sociological studies of contagious dynamics and for
the design of efficient commercial viral processes.
PACS numbers: 89.20.Hh, 89.65.-s, 89.75.Fb, 89.75.Hc
I. INTRODUCTION
Locating influential nodes in spreading dynamics is of ut-
most importance to understand and control these processes.
In the case of epidemic spreading [2–4], the identification of
the nodes responsible of system-wide disease outbreaks [1]
has obvious advantages. For instance, this might allow min-
imizing the impact of the disease by dampening or remov-
ing the spreading capacity of influential nodes. Although ru-
mor spreading processes are in some aspects similar to the
propagation of epidemic diseases [5], they are essentially de-
signed to achieve the opposite goal, namely, to spread a piece
of information (or news, opinions, etc) to as many nodes as
possible. As a matter of fact, rumor-like mechanisms form
the basis for many phenomena such as viral marketing, where
companies exploit social networks to promote their products.
The goal, then, is not to short-circuit the spreading process,
but rather to explore ways to guarantee the highest outcome
[6, 7]. Thus, singling out “privileged spreaders” may be a way
to maximize the chances to succeed in a marketing campaign
at lower costs.
Beyond commercial issues, recent social events also place
the question of influential spreaders in the spotlight. All
along 2011, we have witnessed an unusual amount of so-
cial unrest throughout the world. In the aftermath of fi-
nancial and political crisis, and changes to welfare policies,
protests have aroused in the form of pacific civil movements
–the Spanish “indignados” in May or Occupy Wall-Street in
the United States, culminated in global marches in October
15th.–, economy-related demonstrations with some violent
episodes –Greece–, political (and sometimes violent) uprises
–the “Arab spring”– and still unclear riots in the United King-
dom in the last summer. In all of them, different online social
sites (Facebook, Twitter, etc.) played an unprecedented key
role at triggering collective phenomena and were used to help
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protesters disseminate their opinions and mottos to attain a
critical mass of participants [8–10] These new forms of social
mobilization and protest demand new quantitative approaches
to answer old sociological questions, such as how protest ad-
herents share information and synchronize their activity at a
global scale.
In this paper, we focus on a sort of dynamics that can be
used to answer this kind of questions. Specifically, we carry
out extensive numerical simulations of a rumor spreading dy-
namics [11, 12] on a variety of real-world communication net-
works of sizes ranging from roughly 103 to almost 105 nodes.
In doing so, we do not seek who is perceived by the network
as an authority [13, 14], or who is at the top of a hierarchical
structure [15], but rather address the issue of influential nodes
in a dynamical sense, i.e., we aim at identifying the nodes that
play an outstanding role in the dissemination of information.
This dynamical perspective is the one adopted in [1], where
the topological characteristics of nodes with special spreading
capacities under epidemic dynamics (susceptible–infected–
susceptible and susceptible–infected–removed models) were
studied. The authors’ findings indicate that centrality (mea-
sured through the k-core index [16–18]), and not degree, is
the key topological feature to understand such spreading ca-
pacities. Capitalizing on this idea, we wonder whether there
is a way to identify “privileged spreaders” also in rumor dy-
namics. Contrary to the results in [1], we find that there are no
such influential spreaders in rumor dynamics, rather there are
nodes with an outstanding capacity to short-circuit the spread-
ing process (henceforth referred to as firewall nodes). Besides,
as far as the awareness of the rumor concerns, we show that
the latter quantity is positively correlated with nodes’ core-
ness.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II we first sum-
marize the main characteristics of the networks on top of
which the rumor dynamics is run. Next in Sec. III, we detail
which model of rumor spreading we shall be using to obtain
the results presented in Sec. IV. Attending the previous dis-
tinction, we address the spreading and the forwarding/short-
circuiting capacities separately. Our final conclusions are de-
veloped in Sec. V.
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2II. DATASETS.
We have performed extensive numerical simulations of the
dynamics of rumor spreading (presented in the next section)
on top of several real-world networks. These networks are all
relevant for the sort of dynamics we are dealing with. The
networks used are:
a. Email contact network The network of email contacts
is based on email messages sent and received within the Uni-
versitat Rovira i Virgili [19]. The data were collected in the
time window between January and March of 2002. Nodes
in the network represent email accounts, and an undirected
link is placed whenever two email accounts exchanged emails,
i.e. the lack of link direction reflects the fact that data is re-
stricted to reciprocal communications. We consider only the
giant connected component, which contains N = 1133 nodes
(out of a total of 1700) with an average degree of 〈k〉 = 9.6.
b. Political blogs network Adamic and Glance [20] gave
empirical evidence of the emergence of modular structure in
the blogosphere around the specific topic of U.S. warfare pol-
icy, and the interaction of these communication tools with
mainstream media. For this work they collected a directed
network of hyperlinks between weblogs on U.S. politics, i.e.
links stand for each time bloggers referred to one another. The
giant connected component contains N = 1222 with an aver-
age degree of 〈k〉 = 27.3.
c. The Internet at the Autonomous Systems level (AS) net-
work Nodes in the AS network are autonomous systems
which are connected if there exists a physical connection be-
tween them. An AS is a connected group of one or more IP
prefixes run by one or more network operators which has a
single routing policy. Data have been recorded by CAIDA
and corresponds to the snapshot of this structure of December
2009. The largest connected component of the AS network
consists of 33235 ASs with an average degree 〈k〉 = 4.5.
d. Twitter network Twitter is a microblogging site
which, among other features, allows users to establish almost-
static relations with other users by “following” them. This
implies that if user i follows j, i will be informed of every
message j emits; in Twitter’s jargon, i is one of j’s follower.
To extract this information for a subset of Twitter users in
Spain [9], data were scrapped directly from www.twitter.com
using a cloud of 128 different nodes of a subnet. The scrap
was successful for 87569 users, for whom we obtained their
official list of followers. It is worth remarking that the extrac-
tion of followers gave a list in the order of 3 millions users,
which roughly coincides with the order of the audience esti-
mated by Twitter in Spain; the list was however restricted to
users who had some participation in the Spanish May 15th
protests. The resulting structure is a directed network, direc-
tion indicates who follows who in the online social platform.
Incoming links to a node i signal which users i is listening to,
whereas out-going links point at those who are paying atten-
tion to (following) i.
We have also characterized the above networks according to
their k-core index. This is done using the standard procedure
[17, 18]: particular subsets of the network, called k-cores, are
each obtained by recursively removing all the vertices of de-
gree less than k (where k = kin + kout) until all vertices in
the remaining graph have degree at least k. The higher the
coreness of a node, the closer it is to the nucleus or core of the
network.
III. RUMOR DYNAMICS
The model we shall consider is defined in the following way
[12]. Each of the N elements of the network can be in three
possible states. We call a node holding an update and will-
ing to transmit it a spreader. Nodes that are unaware of the
update will be called ignorants while those that already know
it but are not willing to spread the update anymore are called
stiflers. We denote the density of ignorants, spreaders, and
stiflers at time t as ψ(t), φ(t) and s(t) respectively, such that
ψ(t) + φ(t) + s(t) = 1, ∀t. The spreading process takes
place along the links between spreaders and ignorants. Each
time step, spreaders contact one (or more) neighboring node.
When the spreader contacts an ignorant, the last one turns into
a new spreader at a rate λ. On the other hand, the spreader be-
comes a stifler with rate α if a contact with another spreader
or a stifler takes place. This dynamics mimics the attempt to
diffuse an update or rumor by nodes which have been recently
updated. At the same time, if a node attempts too many times
to communicate the update to nodes which have already re-
ceived it, it stops the process, turning itself into a stifler. The
dynamics terminates when the number of spreaders is 0, i.e.
nobody in the network can circulate the rumor further.
From this general framework we have devised two versions
of the dynamics. In the first one, at each time step the φN
spreaders are allowed to contact a single neighbor chosen at
random (“contact process”, CP from now on). In the second,
at each time step, each of the φN spreaders contacts all its
neighbors in a random sequence, unless during a contact it
turns into a stifler. In this case it immediately stops contacting
further nodes (“truncated process”, TP from now on). This
accounts for the larger transmission capabilities of high degree
nodes that can reach a larger number of neighbors as specified
by the heterogeneous network topology. In both versions, the
initial conditions are set such that ψ(0) = 1 − 1/N , φ(0) =
1/N and s(0) = 0. In addition, without loss of generality and
unless explicitly stated, we fix from now on λ = 1 and α = 1.
IV. RESULTS
Extensive numerical calculations were carried out simulat-
ing the dynamics of rumor propagation for both settings on
top of the real-world networks previously introduced. From
an initial scenario, in which all nodes belong to the ignorants
class except the seed, we perform S simulations. This is re-
peated for each node, i.e. every vertex of a network of N
nodes acts as the initial seed S times, to obtain statistically
significant results. S is set to 103 for the smallest networks,
and to 102 for the larger ones due to computational costs. In
this way, for each node i, we average the final density of sti-
flers in the network si∞. This quantity accounts for the spread-
3ing capacity of node i, which quantifies how deep the rumor
penetrated the network when node i was the initial seed:
si∞ =
1
S
S∑
m=1
si,m∞ (1)
where si,m∞ represents the final density of stiflers for a particu-
lar run m with origin at node i. With this information at hand
for all nodes, we coarse-grain the individual si∞’s into classes
of nodes according to their degree. Thus, MkS represents the
average stifler density for all runs with a seed with a kS core
index:
MkS =
∑
i∈ΥkS
si∞
NkS
(2)
where ΥkS is the set of all NkS nodes with kS values. Sim-
ilarly, the final density of stiflers obtained when node i acts
as the initial spreader is averaged over all the seeds with the
same (k, kS) values [1]:
Mk,kS =
∑
i∈ΥkS,k
si∞
NkS ,k
(3)
where ΥkS ,k is the set of all NkS ,k nodes with (k, kS) values.
A. Spreading capability
Figure 1 shows results from simulations of the rumor dy-
namics using both the contact and the truncated settings on
top of two of the networks used (similar results are obtained
for the rest of networks). As it can be seen, MkS is almost
invariant regardless of the core number of the seed node. In
other words, the spreading capabilities of the different nodes
are almost the same wherever the dissemination begins. This
implies that the topological position of nodes has no impact
on the final success of a rumor, revealing an absence of influ-
ential spreaders for rumor dynamics.
This counterintuitive result is in sharp contradiction with
results obtained for epidemic dynamics in [1], and underlines
the fact that, beyond shallow similarities with such processes
(specially in reference to the SIR scheme), rumor dynamics
display a markedly different behavior. In an attempt to un-
derstand these differences, we hypothesize that barriers to in-
formation dissemination must be placed in topologically im-
portant nodes. In other words, the dynamics favors that cen-
tral nodes (as given by the connectivity) turn into the stifler
class [12], thus short-circuiting any further expansion of the
rumor. Be this true, such firewall nodes must belong to the
subset of the population which become stiflers more quickly.
This amounts to say that nodes belonging to a higher core
should promptly reach the stifler class. Furthermore, k-shells
are built up of nodes with heterogeneous degrees, thus nodes
with higher degrees should also turn to stiflers more rapidly
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FIG. 1: (color online) Average stifler density for rumor processes
initiated at nodes with coreness kS . The top panel shows the results
obtained for the CP run on top of the email network, while the bot-
tom panel represents the same dependency but for the TP on top of
the political blogs network. As it can be seen from the figures, no
matter the value of α, there is no correlation between MkS and the
seeds centrality, which leads to the absence of influential spreaders
in rumor dynamics.
than lower degree nodes within the same class kS . Figure 2
represents this situation for the largest networks analyzed in
this work (AS, left panels a; Twitter, right panels b). This
plot shows, for each node in the network, the average time it
takes to become a stifler t(s). To grasp in a single figure the
influence of the core level kS and degree heterogeneity within
these levels, we have normalized k. That is, for a node be-
longing to the shell S, its normalized degree is measured as
knorm =
ki − kSmin
kSmax − kSmin
(4)
where kSmin is the minimum degree in shell S, and k
S
max is
the maximum. In doing so, we can overlap all t(s) on a com-
mon interval [0, 1], so we can easily check if the hypotheses
actually hold. The time t(s) has also been normalized in Fig-
ure 2 to allow comparison across dynamics (CP and TP, upper
and lower panels respectively) and between networks. For the
sake of clarity, we have highlighted only two k-shells, a pe-
ripheral one (i.e., low kS , red circles) and that with the highest
index (kSmax , green triangles).
Figure 2 reveals that indeed nodes in the highest core turn to
stiflers quite early, compared to the rest of the network. Also,
the main trend within the highest core is that t(s) decreases
as the degree of nodes belonging to that core increases. This
is clearly seen specially for the TP setting (lower panels), but
also in the CP dynamics except for some nodes with high-
est degrees (right-most dots). These statements are even more
clear when confronted to results corresponding to nodes in the
7th shell (red circles), which shows (with few exceptions) sys-
tematically larger t(s)s. Therefore, the absence of influential
spreaders in rumor dynamics is translated into the existence of
4FIG. 2: (color online) Central nodes (those in the highest k-shell) act as firewalls of the rumor spreading. This hypothesis is validated by the
fact that they are among the first to become stiflers (low values of t(s)), thus acting as topological barriers for the dynamics. Within these
central nodes, the time at which they turn into stiflers is even earlier for those with highest degree –the exception to this being a small fraction
of them in the CP setting (upper panels). See main text for details.
critical firewalls that do depend on the coreness of the nodes.
B. Awareness of information
The previous results suggest a different approach to the con-
cept of influential nodes in rumor spreading dynamics. The
existence of critical firewalls demands their turning to stiflers,
which in turn implies their being spreaders in the first place. If
critical firewalls can systematically short-circuit the dissem-
ination of information, it is only because they can actually
“hear” any rumor circulating in the network. Thus, beyond
the capacity of a seed to generate system-wide information
cascades, one must also take into account who in the network
keeps track of all the information. For instance, in the con-
text of social protest and unrest, agents who have access to
most of the information may have an important role in filter-
ing knowledge (perhaps acting as information sinks) and in
coordinating and synchronizing the collective action. Actu-
ally, empirical data evidences that these critical nodes may act
as enhancers sometimes, and as firewalls others [8].
Figure 3 illustrates the previous idea. The different pan-
els represent the proportion of nodes, Mk,kS , that have heard
the rumor at the end of the process. The results depicted in
all panels suggest that, in most cases, centrality (high core)
is a sufficient condition to become aware of the rumor in at
least half the number of processes simulated (cold colors indi-
cate low awareness, less than 50%, whereas colors in the scale
from white to red indicate a fraction larger than 50% of heard
messages). Unsurprisingly, nodes with large k are also aware
of most rumors because of the many paths leading to them. In
this sense, we find that the coreness is a better descriptor than
the degree when it comes to quantify how likely is that a given
node be in the stifler class at the end of the rumor dynamics.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Recent events throughout the world involving civil move-
ments and collective action –critically aided by online so-
cial networks– have called attention to the problem of iden-
tifying influential spreaders. This question has many facets
(hierarchies, authorities, prestige measures), but Kitsak et al.
[1] have addressed it linking a vertex topological feature (k-
core) with its dynamic behavior in a simple and operative way.
However, previous works have only dealt with epidemic dy-
namics, which do not grasp all phenomena at stake when it
comes to information dissemination. In this work we present
an alternative dynamical process which is more suited to de-
scribe contagious dynamics that are mediated by information
spreading. Taking four real-world communication networks
in which such dynamical processes may take place, we have
performed extensive numerical simulations of two versions of
a rumor dynamics [6, 7, 12].
Three main conclusions stem from this work. First, the
rumor dynamics does not favor the appearance of influential
spreaders. No matter where a rumor is triggered, the fraction
of stifler nodes is similar for the same values of the parame-
ters. Second, the absence of such privileged spreaders does
not imply that central nodes (may them belong to a high k-
shell or have a large k) are not important in the dynamics.
However, such distinct role is not as enhancers of the dis-
semination, rather they behave like firewalls that interrupt the
propagation of information. Indeed, it follows that the k-core
index is a useful predictor of different roles in the context of
rumor dynamics, but it is paradoxically in the opposite direc-
tion of what one would expect. The short time needed by
topologically outstanding nodes to turn into stiflers is a good
indicator of how they choke the spreading at early times –and
5k
a
100
101
102
ks ks
d
100
105
101
103
104
102
1 20 1201006040 80 140
c104
25
100
101
102
103
5 15
2 4 6 8 10
b
100
101
102
103
5 15 20 2510 30 35
FIG. 3: (color online) Awareness level, i.e., percentage of nodes that have heard the rumor, for each class (k, kS) for the four networks used
in this work −a) email network, b) political blogs network, c) AS network and d) Twitter network. We have represented the results obtained
for the TP, but the CP dynamics give qualitatively similar results. Nodes with low degree (compared to kmax) but mid-to-high coreness are
systematically reached by roughly any generated rumor, regardless of its origin (colors white to red correspond to an awareness level above
50%, while light green indicates that no nodes belong to that class. See the text for further details.
they do so regardless of the seed, hence the observed uniform
spreading capacity. This result agrees with empirical facts re-
cently reported: hubs may play the role of information filters
or sinks [8].
Finally, in connection to the previous point, the fact that
central nodes act as rumor firewalls implies that many rumors
reach them before dying out. This means that, although there
are no privileged spreaders, nodes in high core levels have in-
formation advantage in the form of awareness, i.e. they have
access to all the information circulating around the network.
We believe that research on rumor models can be taken fur-
ther. Data from online social networks offers unprecedented
opportunities to gain insight in how –and where– information
is generated, exchanged, forwarded or banned. From this ev-
idence we might devise more realistic dynamics that increase
our understanding of this phenomenology.
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